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Abstract
Given a state-of-the-art deep neural network classifier,
we show the existence of a universal (image-agnostic) and
very small perturbation vector that causes natural images
to be misclassified with high probability. We propose a sys-
tematic algorithm for computing universal perturbations,
and show that state-of-the-art deep neural networks are
highly vulnerable to such perturbations, albeit being quasi-
imperceptible to the human eye. We further empirically an-
alyze these universal perturbations and show, in particular,
that they generalize very well across neural networks. The
surprising existence of universal perturbations reveals im-
portant geometric correlations among the high-dimensional
decision boundary of classifiers. It further outlines poten-
tial security breaches with the existence of single directions
in the input space that adversaries can possibly exploit to
break a classifier on most natural images.1
1. Introduction
Can we find a single small image perturbation that fools
a state-of-the-art deep neural network classifier on all nat-
ural images? We show in this paper the existence of such
quasi-imperceptible universal perturbation vectors that lead
to misclassify natural images with high probability. Specif-
ically, by adding such a quasi-imperceptible perturbation
to natural images, the label estimated by the deep neu-
ral network is changed with high probability (see Fig. 1).
Such perturbations are dubbed universal, as they are image-
agnostic. The existence of these perturbations is problem-
atic when the classifier is deployed in real-world (and pos-
sibly hostile) environments, as they can be exploited by ad-
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1To encourage reproducible research, the code is available at gitHub.
Furthermore, a video demonstrating the effect of universal perturbations
on a smartphone can be found here.
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Figure 1: When added to a natural image, a universal per-
turbation image causes the image to be misclassified by the
deep neural network with high probability. Left images:
Original natural images. The labels are shown on top of
each arrow. Central image: Universal perturbation. Right
images: Perturbed images. The estimated labels of the per-
turbed images are shown on top of each arrow.
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versaries to break the classifier. Indeed, the perturbation
process involves the mere addition of one very small pertur-
bation to all natural images, and can be relatively straight-
forward to implement by adversaries in real-world environ-
ments, while being relatively difficult to detect as such per-
turbations are very small and thus do not significantly affect
data distributions. The surprising existence of universal per-
turbations further reveals new insights on the topology of
the decision boundaries of deep neural networks. We sum-
marize the main contributions of this paper as follows:
• We show the existence of universal image-agnostic
perturbations for state-of-the-art deep neural networks.
• We propose an algorithm for finding such perturba-
tions. The algorithm seeks a universal perturbation for
a set of training points, and proceeds by aggregating
atomic perturbation vectors that send successive data-
points to the decision boundary of the classifier.
• We show that universal perturbations have a remark-
able generalization property, as perturbations com-
puted for a rather small set of training points fool new
images with high probability.
• We show that such perturbations are not only univer-
sal across images, but also generalize well across deep
neural networks. Such perturbations are therefore dou-
bly universal, both with respect to the data and the net-
work architectures.
• We explain and analyze the high vulnerability of deep
neural networks to universal perturbations by examin-
ing the geometric correlation between different parts
of the decision boundary.
The robustness of image classifiers to structured and un-
structured perturbations have recently attracted a lot of at-
tention [19, 16, 20, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14]. Despite the impressive
performance of deep neural network architectures on chal-
lenging visual classification benchmarks [6, 9, 21, 10], these
classifiers were shown to be highly vulnerable to perturba-
tions. In [19], such networks are shown to be unstable to
very small and often imperceptible additive adversarial per-
turbations. Such carefully crafted perturbations are either
estimated by solving an optimization problem [19, 11, 1]
or through one step of gradient ascent [5], and result in a
perturbation that fools a specific data point. A fundamental
property of these adversarial perturbations is their intrin-
sic dependence on datapoints: the perturbations are specif-
ically crafted for each data point independently. As a re-
sult, the computation of an adversarial perturbation for a
new data point requires solving a data-dependent optimiza-
tion problem from scratch, which uses the full knowledge
of the classification model. This is different from the uni-
versal perturbation considered in this paper, as we seek a
single perturbation vector that fools the network on most
natural images. Perturbing a new datapoint then only in-
volves the mere addition of the universal perturbation to the
image (and does not require solving an optimization prob-
lem/gradient computation). Finally, we emphasize that our
notion of universal perturbation differs from the general-
ization of adversarial perturbations studied in [19], where
perturbations computed on the MNIST task were shown to
generalize well across different models. Instead, we exam-
ine the existence of universal perturbations that are common
to most data points belonging to the data distribution.
2. Universal perturbations
We formalize in this section the notion of universal per-
turbations, and propose a method for estimating such per-
turbations. Let µ denote a distribution of images in Rd, and
kˆ define a classification function that outputs for each im-
age x ∈ Rd an estimated label kˆ(x). The main focus of this
paper is to seek perturbation vectors v ∈ Rd that fool the
classifier kˆ on almost all datapoints sampled from µ. That
is, we seek a vector v such that
kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x) for “most” x ∼ µ.
We coin such a perturbation universal, as it represents a
fixed image-agnostic perturbation that causes label change
for most images sampled from the data distribution µ. We
focus here on the case where the distribution µ represents
the set of natural images, hence containing a huge amount
of variability. In that context, we examine the existence of
small universal perturbations (in terms of the `p norm with
p ∈ [1,∞)) that misclassify most images. The goal is there-
fore to find v that satisfies the following two constraints:
1. ‖v‖p ≤ ξ,
2. P
x∼µ
(
kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x)
)
≥ 1− δ.
The parameter ξ controls the magnitude of the perturbation
vector v, and δ quantifies the desired fooling rate for all
images sampled from the distribution µ.
Algorithm. Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be a set of images
sampled from the distribution µ. Our proposed algorithm
seeks a universal perturbation v, such that ‖v‖p ≤ ξ, while
fooling most data points in X . The algorithm proceeds it-
eratively over the data points in X and gradually builds the
universal perturbation, as illustrated in Fig. 2. At each iter-
ation, the minimal perturbation ∆vi that sends the current
perturbed point, xi+v, to the decision boundary of the clas-
sifier is computed, and aggregated to the current instance
of the universal perturbation. In more details, provided the
current universal perturbation v does not fool data point xi,
we seek the extra perturbation ∆vi with minimal norm that
allows to fool data point xi by solving the following opti-
∆v 1
x1,2,3
R1
R2
v
∆v 2
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of the proposed algo-
rithm used to compute universal perturbations. In this il-
lustration, data points x1, x2 and x3 are super-imposed, and
the classification regions Ri (i.e., regions of constant esti-
mated label) are shown in different colors. Our algorithm
proceeds by aggregating sequentially the minimal perturba-
tions sending the current perturbed points xi + v outside of
the corresponding classification regionRi.
mization problem:
∆vi ← arg min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. kˆ(xi + v + r) 6= kˆ(xi). (1)
To ensure that the constraint ‖v‖p ≤ ξ is satisfied, the up-
dated universal perturbation is further projected on the `p
ball of radius ξ and centered at 0. That is, let Pp,ξ be the
projection operator defined as follows:
Pp,ξ(v) = arg min
v′
‖v − v′‖2 subject to ‖v′‖p ≤ ξ.
Then, our update rule is given by v ← Pp,ξ(v+ ∆vi). Sev-
eral passes on the data set X are performed to improve the
quality of the universal perturbation. The algorithm is ter-
minated when the empirical “fooling rate” on the perturbed
data set Xv := {x1 + v, . . . , xm + v} exceeds the target
threshold 1− δ. That is, we stop the algorithm whenever
Err(Xv) :=
1
m
m∑
i=1
1kˆ(xi+v) 6=kˆ(xi) ≥ 1− δ.
The detailed algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. Interest-
ingly, in practice, the number of data points m in X need
not be large to compute a universal perturbation that is valid
for the whole distribution µ. In particular, we can set m
to be much smaller than the number of training points (see
Section 3).
The proposed algorithm involves solving at most m in-
stances of the optimization problem in Eq. (1) for each pass.
While this optimization problem is not convex when kˆ is a
Algorithm 1 Computation of universal perturbations.
1: input: Data points X , classifier kˆ, desired `p norm of
the perturbation ξ, desired accuracy on perturbed sam-
ples δ.
2: output: Universal perturbation vector v.
3: Initialize v ← 0.
4: while Err(Xv) ≤ 1− δ do
5: for each datapoint xi ∈ X do
6: if kˆ(xi + v) = kˆ(xi) then
7: Compute the minimal perturbation that
sends xi + v to the decision boundary:
∆vi ← arg min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. kˆ(xi + v + r) 6= kˆ(xi).
8: Update the perturbation:
v ← Pp,ξ(v + ∆vi).
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
standard classifier (e.g., a deep neural network), several ef-
ficient approximate methods have been devised for solving
this problem [19, 11, 7]. We use in the following the ap-
proach in [11] for its efficency. It should further be noticed
that the objective of Algorithm 1 is not to find the smallest
universal perturbation that fools most data points sampled
from the distribution, but rather to find one such perturba-
tion with sufficiently small norm. In particular, different
random shufflings of the set X naturally lead to a diverse
set of universal perturbations v satisfying the required con-
straints. The proposed algorithm can therefore be leveraged
to generate multiple universal perturbations for a deep neu-
ral network (see next section for visual examples).
3. Universal perturbations for deep nets
We now analyze the robustness of state-of-the-art deep
neural network classifiers to universal perturbations using
Algorithm 1.
In a first experiment, we assess the estimated universal
perturbations for different recent deep neural networks on
the ILSVRC 2012 [15] validation set (50,000 images), and
report the fooling ratio, that is the proportion of images that
change labels when perturbed by our universal perturbation.
Results are reported for p = 2 and p = ∞, where we
respectively set ξ = 2000 and ξ = 10. These numerical
values were chosen in order to obtain a perturbation whose
norm is significantly smaller than the image norms, such
that the perturbation is quasi-imperceptible when added to
CaffeNet [8] VGG-F [2] VGG-16 [17] VGG-19 [17] GoogLeNet [18] ResNet-152 [6]
`2
X 85.4% 85.9% 90.7% 86.9% 82.9% 89.7%
Val. 85.6 87.0% 90.3% 84.5% 82.0% 88.5%
`∞
X 93.1% 93.8% 78.5% 77.8% 80.8% 85.4%
Val. 93.3% 93.7% 78.3% 77.8% 78.9% 84.0%
Table 1: Fooling ratios on the set X , and the validation set.
natural images2. Results are listed in Table 1. Each result
is reported on the set X , which is used to compute the per-
turbation, as well as on the validation set (that is not used
in the process of the computation of the universal pertur-
bation). Observe that for all networks, the universal per-
turbation achieves very high fooling rates on the validation
set. Specifically, the universal perturbations computed for
CaffeNet and VGG-F fool more than 90% of the validation
set (for p = ∞). In other words, for any natural image in
the validation set, the mere addition of our universal per-
turbation fools the classifier more than 9 times out of 10.
This result is moreover not specific to such architectures,
as we can also find universal perturbations that cause VGG,
GoogLeNet and ResNet classifiers to be fooled on natural
images with probability edging 80%. These results have an
element of surprise, as they show the existence of single
universal perturbation vectors that cause natural images to
be misclassified with high probability, albeit being quasi-
imperceptible to humans. To verify this latter claim, we
show visual examples of perturbed images in Fig. 3, where
the GoogLeNet architecture is used. These images are ei-
ther taken from the ILSVRC 2012 validation set, or cap-
tured using a mobile phone camera. Observe that in most
cases, the universal perturbation is quasi-imperceptible, yet
this powerful image-agnostic perturbation is able to mis-
classify any image with high probability for state-of-the-art
classifiers. We refer to the supp. material for the original
(unperturbed) images, as well as their ground truth labels.
We also refer to the video in the supplementary material for
real-world examples on a smartphone. We visualize the uni-
versal perturbations corresponding to different networks in
Fig. 4. It should be noted that such universal perturbations
are not unique, as many different universal perturbations (all
satisfying the two required constraints) can be generated for
the same network. In Fig. 5, we visualize five different
universal perturbations obtained by using different random
shufflings in X . Observe that such universal perturbations
are different, although they exhibit a similar pattern. This
is moreover confirmed by computing the normalized inner
products between two pairs of perturbation images, as the
normalized inner products do not exceed 0.1, which shows
that one can find diverse universal perturbations.
2For comparison, the average `2 and `∞ norm of an image in the vali-
dation set is respectively ≈ 5× 104 and ≈ 250.
While the above universal perturbations are computed
for a set X of 10,000 images from the training set (i.e., in
average 10 images per class), we now examine the influence
of the size of X on the quality of the universal perturbation.
We show in Fig. 6 the fooling rates obtained on the val-
idation set for different sizes of X for GoogLeNet. Note
for example that with a set X containing only 500 images,
we can fool more than 30% of the images on the validation
set. This result is significant when compared to the num-
ber of classes in ImageNet (1000), as it shows that we can
fool a large set of unseen images, even when using a set
X containing less than one image per class! The universal
perturbations computed using Algorithm 1 have therefore a
remarkable generalization power over unseen data points,
and can be computed on a very small set of training images.
Cross-model universality. While the computed pertur-
bations are universal across unseen data points, we now ex-
amine their cross-model universality. That is, we study to
which extent universal perturbations computed for a spe-
cific architecture (e.g., VGG-19) are also valid for another
architecture (e.g., GoogLeNet). Table 2 displays a matrix
summarizing the universality of such perturbations across
six different architectures. For each architecture, we com-
pute a universal perturbation and report the fooling ratios on
all other architectures; we report these in the rows of Table
2. Observe that, for some architectures, the universal pertur-
bations generalize very well across other architectures. For
example, universal perturbations computed for the VGG-19
network have a fooling ratio above 53% for all other tested
architectures. This result shows that our universal perturba-
tions are, to some extent, doubly-universal as they general-
ize well across data points and very different architectures.
It should be noted that, in [19], adversarial perturbations
were previously shown to generalize well, to some extent,
across different neural networks on the MNIST problem.
Our results are however different, as we show the general-
izability of universal perturbations across different architec-
tures on the ImageNet data set. This result shows that such
perturbations are of practical relevance, as they generalize
well across data points and architectures. In particular, in
order to fool a new image on an unknown neural network, a
simple addition of a universal perturbation computed on the
VGG-19 architecture is likely to misclassify the data point.
wool Indian elephant Indian elephant African grey tabby African grey
common newt carousel grey fox macaw three-toed sloth macaw
Figure 3: Examples of perturbed images and their corresponding labels. The first 8 images belong to the ILSVRC 2012
validation set, and the last 4 are images taken by a mobile phone camera. See supp. material for the original images.
(a) CaffeNet (b) VGG-F (c) VGG-16
(d) VGG-19 (e) GoogLeNet (f) ResNet-152
Figure 4: Universal perturbations computed for different deep neural network architectures. Images generated with p =∞,
ξ = 10. The pixel values are scaled for visibility.
Visualization of the effect of universal perturbations.
To gain insights on the effect of universal perturbations on
natural images, we now visualize the distribution of labels
on the ImageNet validation set. Specifically, we build a di-
rected graph G = (V,E), whose vertices denote the labels,
and directed edges e = (i → j) indicate that the majority
of images of class i are fooled into label j when applying
the universal perturbation. The existence of edges i → j
therefore suggests that the preferred fooling label for im-
ages of class i is j. We construct this graph for GoogLeNet,
and visualize the full graph in the supp. material for space
constraints. The visualization of this graph shows a very pe-
culiar topology. In particular, the graph is a union of disjoint
components, where all edges in one component mostly con-
nect to one target label. See Fig. 7 for an illustration of two
connected components. This visualization clearly shows the
existence of several dominant labels, and that universal per-
turbations mostly make natural images classified with such
Figure 5: Diversity of universal perturbations for the GoogLeNet architecture. The five perturbations are generated using
different random shufflings of the set X . Note that the normalized inner products for any pair of universal perturbations does
not exceed 0.1, which highlights the diversity of such perturbations.
VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-152
VGG-F 93.7% 71.8% 48.4% 42.1% 42.1% 47.4 %
CaffeNet 74.0% 93.3% 47.7% 39.9% 39.9% 48.0%
GoogLeNet 46.2% 43.8% 78.9% 39.2% 39.8% 45.5%
VGG-16 63.4% 55.8% 56.5% 78.3% 73.1% 63.4%
VGG-19 64.0% 57.2% 53.6% 73.5% 77.8% 58.0%
ResNet-152 46.3% 46.3% 50.5% 47.0% 45.5% 84.0%
Table 2: Generalizability of the universal perturbations across different networks. The percentages indicate the fooling rates.
The rows indicate the architecture for which the universal perturbations is computed, and the columns indicate the architecture
for which the fooling rate is reported.
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Figure 6: Fooling ratio on the validation set versus the size
of X . Note that even when the universal perturbation is
computed on a very small set X (compared to training and
validation sets), the fooling ratio on validation set is large.
labels. We hypothesize that these dominant labels occupy
large regions in the image space, and therefore represent
good candidate labels for fooling most natural images. Note
that these dominant labels are automatically found by Algo-
rithm 1, and are not imposed a priori in the computation of
perturbations.
Fine-tuning with universal perturbations. We now ex-
amine the effect of fine-tuning the networks with perturbed
images. We use the VGG-F architecture, and fine-tune the
network based on a modified training set where universal
perturbations are added to a fraction of (clean) training sam-
ples: for each training point, a universal perturbation is
added with probability 0.5, and the original sample is pre-
served with probability 0.5.3 To account for the diversity
of universal perturbations, we pre-compute a pool of 10 dif-
ferent universal perturbations and add perturbations to the
training samples randomly from this pool. The network is
fine-tuned by performing 5 extra epochs of training on the
modified training set. To assess the effect of fine-tuning on
the robustness of the network, we compute a new universal
perturbation for the fine-tuned network (using Algorithm 1,
with p = ∞ and ξ = 10), and report the fooling rate of the
network. After 5 extra epochs, the fooling rate on the vali-
dation set is 76.2%, which shows an improvement with re-
spect to the original network (93.7%, see Table 1).4 Despite
this improvement, the fine-tuned network remains largely
vulnerable to small universal perturbations. We therefore
3In this fine-tuning experiment, we use a slightly modified notion of
universal perturbations, where the direction of the universal vector v is
fixed for all data points, while its magnitude is adaptive. That is, for each
data point x, we consider the perturbed point x+αv, where α is the small-
est coefficient that fools the classifier. We observed that this feedbacking
strategy is less prone to overfitting than the strategy where the universal
perturbation is simply added to all training points.
4This fine-tuning procedure moreover led to a minor increase in the
error rate on the validation set, which might be due to a slight overfitting
of the perturbed data.
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Figure 7: Two connected components of the graph G = (V,E), where the vertices are the set of labels, and directed edges
i→ j indicate that most images of class i are fooled into class j.
repeated the above procedure (i.e., computation of a pool of
10 universal perturbations for the fine-tuned network, fine-
tuning of the new network based on the modified training
set for 5 extra epochs), and we obtained a new fooling ra-
tio of 80.0%. In general, the repetition of this procedure
for a fixed number of times did not yield any improvement
over the 76.2% fooling ratio obtained after one step of fine-
tuning. Hence, while fine-tuning the network leads to a mild
improvement in the robustness, we observed that this sim-
ple solution does not fully immune against small universal
perturbations.
4. Explaining the vulnerability to universal
perturbations
The goal of this section is to analyze and explain the high
vulnerability of deep neural network classifiers to univer-
sal perturbations. To understand the unique characteristics
of universal perturbations, we first compare such perturba-
tions with other types of perturbations, namely i) random
perturbation, ii) adversarial perturbation computed for a
randomly picked sample (computed using the DF and FGS
methods respectively in [11] and [5]), iii) sum of adversar-
ial perturbations over X , and iv) mean of the images (or
ImageNet bias). For each perturbation, we depict a phase
transition graph in Fig. 8 showing the fooling rate on the
validation set with respect to the `2 norm of the perturba-
tion. Different perturbation norms are achieved by scaling
accordingly each perturbation with a multiplicative factor to
have the target norm. Note that the universal perturbation is
computed for ξ = 2000, and also scaled accordingly.
Observe that the proposed universal perturbation quickly
reaches very high fooling rates, even when the perturbation
is constrained to be of small norm. For example, the uni-
versal perturbation computed using Algorithm 1 achieves
a fooling rate of 85% when the `2 norm is constrained to
ξ = 2000, while other perturbations achieve much smaller
ratios for comparable norms. In particular, random vec-
tors sampled uniformly from the sphere of radius of 2000
only fool 10% of the validation set. The large difference
between universal and random perturbations suggests that
the universal perturbation exploits some geometric correla-
tions between different parts of the decision boundary of the
classifier. In fact, if the orientations of the decision bound-
ary in the neighborhood of different data points were com-
pletely uncorrelated (and independent of the distance to the
decision boundary), the norm of the best universal perturba-
tion would be comparable to that of a random perturbation.
Note that the latter quantity is well understood (see [4]),
as the norm of the random perturbation required to fool a
specific data point precisely behaves as Θ(
√
d‖r‖2), where
d is the dimension of the input space, and ‖r‖2 is the dis-
tance between the data point and the decision boundary (or
equivalently, the norm of the smallest adversarial perturba-
tion). For the considered ImageNet classification task, this
quantity is equal to
√
d‖r‖2 ≈ 2×104, for most data points,
which is at least one order of magnitude larger than the uni-
versal perturbation (ξ = 2000). This substantial difference
between random and universal perturbations thereby sug-
gests redundancies in the geometry of the decision bound-
aries that we now explore.
For each image x in the validation set, we com-
pute the adversarial perturbation vector r(x) =
arg minr ‖r‖2 s.t. kˆ(x + r) 6= kˆ(x). It is easy to see
that r(x) is normal to the decision boundary of the clas-
sifier (at x + r(x)). The vector r(x) hence captures the
local geometry of the decision boundary in the region
surrounding the data point x. To quantify the correlation
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Figure 8: Comparison between fooling rates of different
perturbations. Experiments performed on the CaffeNet ar-
chitecture.
between different regions of the decision boundary of the
classifier, we define the matrix
N =
[
r(x1)
‖r(x1)‖2 . . .
r(xn)
‖r(xn)‖2
]
of normal vectors to the decision boundary in the vicinity
of n data points in the validation set. For binary linear
classifiers, the decision boundary is a hyperplane, and N
is of rank 1, as all normal vectors are collinear. To capture
more generally the correlations in the decision boundary of
complex classifiers, we compute the singular values of the
matrix N . The singular values of the matrix N , computed
for the CaffeNet architecture are shown in Fig. 9. We fur-
ther show in the same figure the singular values obtained
when the columns of N are sampled uniformly at random
from the unit sphere. Observe that, while the latter singu-
lar values have a slow decay, the singular values of N de-
cay quickly, which confirms the existence of large corre-
lations and redundancies in the decision boundary of deep
networks. More precisely, this suggests the existence of a
subspace S of low dimension d′ (with d′  d), that contains
most normal vectors to the decision boundary in regions
surrounding natural images. We hypothesize that the exis-
tence of universal perturbations fooling most natural images
is partly due to the existence of such a low-dimensional sub-
space that captures the correlations among different regions
of the decision boundary. In fact, this subspace “collects”
normals to the decision boundary in different regions, and
perturbations belonging to this subspace are therefore likely
to fool datapoints. To verify this hypothesis, we choose a
random vector of norm ξ = 2000 belonging to the subspace
S spanned by the first 100 singular vectors, and compute its
fooling ratio on a different set of images (i.e., a set of images
that have not been used to compute the SVD). Such a pertur-
bation can fool nearly 38% of these images, thereby show-
ing that a random direction in this well-sought subspace S
significantly outperforms random perturbations (we recall
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
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Figure 9: Singular values of matrix N containing normal
vectors to the decision decision boundary.
Figure 10: Illustration of the low dimensional subspace
S containing normal vectors to the decision boundary in
regions surrounding natural images. For the purpose of
this illustration, we super-impose three data-points {xi}3i=1,
and the adversarial perturbations {ri}3i=1 that send the re-
spective datapoints to the decision boundary {Bi}3i=1 are
shown. Note that {ri}3i=1 all live in the subspace S.
that such perturbations can only fool 10% of the data). Fig.
10 illustrates the subspace S that captures the correlations
in the decision boundary. It should further be noted that the
existence of this low dimensional subspace explains the sur-
prising generalization properties of universal perturbations
obtained in Fig. 6, where one can build relatively general-
izable universal perturbations with very few images.
Unlike the above experiment, the proposed algorithm
does not choose a random vector in this subspace, but rather
chooses a specific direction in order to maximize the over-
all fooling rate. This explains the gap between the fooling
rates obtained with the random vector strategy in S and Al-
gorithm 1.
5. Conclusions
We showed the existence of small universal perturba-
tions that can fool state-of-the-art classifiers on natural im-
ages. We proposed an iterative algorithm to generate uni-
versal perturbations, and highlighted several properties of
such perturbations. In particular, we showed that universal
perturbations generalize well across different classification
models, resulting in doubly-universal perturbations (image-
agnostic, network-agnostic). We further explained the ex-
istence of such perturbations with the correlation between
different regions of the decision boundary. This provides
insights on the geometry of the decision boundaries of deep
neural networks, and contributes to a better understanding
of such systems. A theoretical analysis of the geometric
correlations between different parts of the decision bound-
ary will be the subject of future research.
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A. Appendix
Fig. 11 shows the original images corresponding to the experiment in Fig. 3. Fig. 12 visualizes the graph showing
relations between original and perturbed labels (see Section 3 for more details).
Bouvier des Flandres Christmas stocking Scottish deerhound ski mask
porcupine killer whale European fire salamander toyshop
fox squirrel pot Arabian camel coffeepot
Figure 11: Original images. The first two rows are randomly chosen images from the validation set, and the last row of
images are personal images taken from a mobile phone camera.
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Figure 12: Graph representing the relation between original and perturbed labels. Note that “dominant labels” appear
systematically. Please zoom for readability. Isolated nodes are removed from this visualization for readability.
